We show that collusive-seeming outcomes may occur in equilibrium in a one-period competitive insurance market characterized by adverse selection. We build on the Inderst and Wambach (2001) model and assume that insurance is compulsory and involves a minimum premium and minimum coverage; these are common features in many health systems. In this setup we show that there is a range of equilibria, from the zero profit one where low-risks implicitly subsidize high risks, to one where firms obtain profits with both types of consumers. Moreover, we show that rents only partially dissipate if we assume free entry. Along these equilibria, high risks always obtain full insurance, while the low risks' coverage decreases as the firms' profits increase.
Introduction
characterized the equilibrium in a one-period adverse selection insurance model. When such an equilibrium exists, it is a separating equilibrium in which low risks are only partially insured, and high risks receive full coverage. This equilibrium may not exist when the proportion of low risks is suf ciently large. Following R&S, a large number of papers have attempted to extend their basic model in order to ensure existence of equilibrium, with some of them addressing the issues of the (potential) non-existence of separating equilibria (e.g., Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986; Hellwig, 1987 Hellwig, , 1988 Asheim and Nilssen, 1996; Inderst andWambach, 2001 ) and others addressing the non-existence of pooling equilibria (e.g., Allard et al., 1997; Newhouse, 1996) .
Our starting point in this work is the Inderst and Wambach model (I&W from now on), which introduced capacity constraints to the R&S model and showed that the separating equilibrium always exists (under some mild additional assumptions). The intuition leading to this result is the following: the separating equilibrium failed to exist in R&S when it could be destabilized by a Pareto superior pooling contract that would be preferred -and bought-by all consumers. However, under capacity constraints, the pooling contract would be bought by only a fraction of consumers. Moreover, these would be high risk consumers as they have "more to gain" and are therefore ready to face, with some probability, positive search costs if they are rationed. 1 We add to this model a feature that is common to many health systems: consumers are obliged to get health insurance and pay some minimum premium, and insurers must offer coverage above a minimum level. Our main result is that in this adverse selection setup collusive-seeming outcomes may be particularly simple to sustain. 2 In a one-period model, homogeneous rms make positive pro ts; and when the number of rms becomes arbitrarily large, aggregate pro ts remain strictly positive. The intuition is simple: the minimum premium constraint limits price competition and forces insurers to compete on coverage. However, because of the adverse selection problem and the capacity constraint, offering a more generous insurance plan than the rest of the rms can be a bad idea, as only high risks end up buying the generous plan. Following a deviation by a rm, high risks have more to gain from the more generous plan than low risks, so only they are willing to risk being rationed.
Although our contribution is mainly theoretical, we consider the issues studied here to be relevant for a number of healthcare systems that have evolved from traditional social insurance schemes -with a national single insurer funded with a xed percentage of workers' salaries-to managed competition schemes with competing insurers. In some cases the minimum premium, probably as an unintended consequence of mandating a minimum standard of insurance or to nance some scheme of solidarity, survives the reforms. Compulsory insurance with a minimum premium and (some degree of) freedom to choose the insurer are common features of health systems in several countries, such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Netherlands, and Germany. 3 In Argentina, the reforms promoted by the World Bank during the nineties aimed at introducing competition among insurers and a minimum coverage plan. Prior to the reforms, formal wage workers were tied to their union health insurance plans (obras sociales), which were nanced by a xed percentage of workers' slaries. The reform introduced competition not only among the different obras sociales, but also with private insurers, while keeping the same nancing mechanism (see Lloyd-Sherlock, 2005 for full description of the reform and a critical account of its results).
In a similar vein, the reform in Colombia in 1993 introduced a managed competition scheme where health plans compete for insurees on the basis of the service and quality of their bene ts packages (above a minimum regulated standard) for a xed risk-adjusted premium and may also compete on additional bene ts and additional premium to complement the basic plan (Pinto and Hsiao, 2007; Londoño, 1996) .
In Germany, a Social Health Insurance covers about 85% of the population, and about 10% chooses a private insurer. After the 2009 reform, private insurers must offer a at premium minimum coverage plan among its options. A similar feature characterized the Dutch system before the 2006 reform (Leiber et al., 2010; Busse et al., 2011) .
The issues studied in this paper are of particular importance in Chile, where in 2004 the ve largest private health insurers were accused of colluding to reduce the level of coverage of their plans. Our results are somewhat consistent with this accusation as we discuss in the nal section. In Chile, workers must contribute a minimum percentage of their salaries to buy individual health insurance either from the national public insurer or from private health insurers. In addition, since 2003 insurers must comply with a minimum coverage regulation that has been slowly increasing through the years, so our model ts the Chilean regulation quite well.
Assuming that the minimum premium constraint is binding for low-risk consumers (i.e., the R&S separating equilibrium is ruled out by this constraint), we characterize the set of symmetric equilibria. In this setup the set of equilibria ranges from a "more competitive" one -with zero pro ts for all rms-to "more collusive" outcomes with positive pro ts. As rms' pro ts increase, the coverage of low risks decreases (their premiums remain at the lowest possible), and the premium for high risks increases (and they remain fully covered). Moreover, free entry may reduce the scope of equilibria, but rents never dissipate completely.
Three elements combine to obtain our result: the minimum premium constraint, rms' capacity constraints (that limits insurees' mobility), and adverse selection. 4 Given the premium constraint, if a rm were to deviate from a collusive equilibrium, it should offer a contract that attracts both low and high risks. In this context, high risks will have more to gain than low risks by "switching" to the deviating rm (because of the single crossing property of utility functions that characterizes adverse selection models). Moreover, given the cost imposed by the probability of being rationed, only high risks will be willing to try to get insurance from the deviating rm. Naturally, if this is the case, no rm will be willing to deviate. Our model clearly illustrates the dangers of imposing minimum premium constraints in markets characterized by adverse selection and rigidities that may limit insurees' mobility.
It is not hard to imagine how capacity constraints could help rms to achieve collusion in a repeated game setup, as it would limit the share of the market that the deviating rm is able to capture and therefore reduce the incentive to do so. However, our result is not in this vein. We show how, in a one-period game, the imposition of a minimum premium constraint may facilitate collusive-seeming outcomes. The relevant benchmark to compare our result is the standard R&S's zero-pro t separating equilibrium, which is always an equilibrium in I&W's setup. To this model we simply add a minimum premium constraint that leads to multiple equilibria, most of them with positive pro ts for all rms. 5 In recent years several papers have extended the R&S model to incorporate an additional dimension of private information (e.g., Smart, 2000; and Wambach, 2000) and found that pro t making contracts can be part of the equilibrium. As pointed out by Snow (2009) , for this result to hold it is required that each insurer offers a single contract. In our setup, however, pro t making contracts are part of the equilibrium despite the fact that there is a single dimension of private information (the risk of accident) and insurers can offer a menu of contracts.
Our original motivation comes from a health insurance problem, and that is how we present the model through the paper. In this context, the existence of capacity constraints, especially in the long run, may be controversial. 6 Instead, our model (and its results) could be, for example, reinterpreted as a worker-rm labor relationship (Guerrieri et al., 2010) , where capacity constraints are more natural. The constraint on the screening variable (the minimum premium in the insurance model) could be interpreted as a limited liabilty constraint on the worker's payment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our model and brie y illustrate R&S and I&W results. In Section 3 we present our results, and conclusions are given in Section 4. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The model
Our model is very similar to the one of I&W, with an additional feature: we assume all consumers are forced to buy insurance and to pay a minimum premium that has an associated minimum level of coverage. We now describe the model and introduce our notation.
Consumers and insurance contracts
There are N consumers in the economy whose expected utility function when they buy no insurance is p x u .W D/ C .1 p x / u .W / ; where W is the consumers' initial wealth, u . / is an strictly increasing and strictly concave function, and the subindex x denotes the individual's type fH; Lg ; which determines the probability p x that the individual suffers the loss D: We assume 0 < p L < p H < 1: collusive outcome is one out of many Nash equilibria in a one-period setup. Two well-known examples are the collusive results that may arise as Nash equilibria in certain auction designs (e.g., a Vickrey auction of shares, Wilson, 1979) and also the potential role of price-matching guarantees as a collusive device (Hay, 1982 , Salop, 1982 . Another example can be found in Dastidar (2001) , who shows how convex costs may allow Bertrand duopolists to act as monopolists in a one-period game.
We further assume that each individual has a probability 2 .0; 1/ of being type H:
An insurance contract in this setup is a pair . ; / ; where is the premium insurees pay (in all events) and is the gross indemnity. Therefore, the expected utility of a type x insured individual is
We assume that the regulation imposes a minimum premium and a minimum coverage that all contracts must satisfy. In the case of health insurance, this minimum level of coverage can be thought of as a minimum standardized set of treatments that must be covered by the private insurers or as the level of coverage that a public insurer/health care provider gives to its af liates.
Firms
We assume there are F 3 risk neutral rms that, by offering a contract . ; / to a type x consumer, obtain an expected pro t of p x : With no loss of generality, we assume that each rm offers a menu of two incentive-compatible contracts denoted by L ; L ; H ; H : Therefore, these satisfy
For simplicity, we assume that all rms are identical, that they have a maximum capacity constraint k < N , and that no rm is indispensable to serve all the market (i.e., .F 1/ k N ). Moreover, we assume that k bN = .F 1/c C F 1: 7
Timing of the game
The timing of the game is as follows: at time 0; nature reveals to each individual his type, and at time 1 each rm offers a menu of contracts (without 7 bzc is the largest integer smaller than or equal to z. The last assumption is made just to simplify the description of the symmetric equilibrium we present in Proposition 1. Obviously, for F 3; k bN = .F 1/c C F 1 implies .F 1/ k N . The assumption that no rm is indispensable simpli es the characterization of the equilibria. Notice that this assumption also works in the direction of nding "more competitive" equilibria since, if all rms were indispensable to serve the whole market, then there would never be a zero-pro t equilibrium.
knowing the type of each particular individual). Then, at time 2; consumers choose the rm and the contract that they will sign. If no rm faces a larger demand than its own capacity, the game ends.
Consumers could be rationed if many of them choose the same rm. We assume that in such a case all individuals face the same risk of being rationed: let n j be the number of consumers who go to rm j; then the probability of being rationed is max 0; n j k =k : Since insurance is mandatory, a consumer rationed at time 2 must visit a new rm and face the search cost c > 0: He could be rationed again and have to visit another rm (and face the search cost again). Given the assumption that .F 1/ k N , a (rational) consumer could be rationed at most F 2 times.
The precise timing of the game is as follows: .1 illustrates the separating equilibrium when the proportion of low-risk consumers is not "too large": the origin illustrates the situation when consumers buy no insurance ( D D 0), the straight line L represents all actuarially fair insurance contracts for low risk individuals (i.e., along this line, rms selling insurance only to type L consumers obtain zero pro ts), and the line H is the analogous for type H consumers. The line 0 is the relevant one when all consumers are pooled in the same contract.
The pair R S H and R S L represents the equilibrium contracts for each type: consumers self-select their respective contracts, which we will denote by R S H ; rms obtain zero pro ts; and no rm can deviate and offer an alternative contract and make strictly positive pro ts. 8 8 It is important to highlight that this model and the extensions considered below are pure adverse selection models and do not consider any moral hazard problems. An individual could potentially behave differently if he has full or partial coverage, being less cautious the more generous his insurance coverage is. In such a setup, partial coverage could be an optimal mechanism to balance the trade-off between providing incentives to reduce the risk of accident and providing insurance. In R&S's setup and its extensions, partial coverage is a screening device that helps separate different risks.
Figure 2.1: Rothschild and Stiglitz Separating Equilibrium
The non-existence problem is illustrated in Figure 2 .2: given the large proportion of low risks (note that 0 is now closer to L ), if all rms offer the contracts represented by R S H and R S L , then one rm could deviate offering a contract such as m: This contract would be attractive to all consumers and produce strictly positive pro ts (as it is above 0 ).
Is it then possible to have a pooling equilibrium? No, because if there is an equilibrium contract on the 0 line (e.g., m 0 ), then an alternative contract such as m 00 could be offered. Moreover, that contract would be chosen only by low-risks and would therefore produce strictly positive pro ts. 9 Inderst and Wambach solution I&W solve the non-existence problem discussed above by assuming that rms have capacity constraints and that rationed consumers must face a search cost to obtain insurance. We shall not discuss their result formally since the proof we will present for our results closely follows I&W's logic. We just brie y discuss the intuition in the problematic case depicted in Figure 2 .2: if a rm offers a contract such as m, then all consumers would prefer this contract if there were no risk of being rationed. However, given that rms are capacity constrained, there will be a positive probability of being rationed and facing the search cost. Since high-risk consumers have more to gain by getting the new contract (this is a consequence of the well-known single crossing property that characterizes these models), in equito the deviating rm, anticipating that non-deviating rms that offered the pooling contract would reject its applicants as they would generate negative expected pro ts. librium of the subgame only they would go to the deviating rm, which as a result would then make losses since the contract m is below the H line. 10
Results
For our minimum premium assumption to have any relevance, it must be binding in equilibrium. We will assume that this is the case; therefore,
(A1) - (4) Moreover, we will assume that the minimum premium constraint is never binding for high risks. 11
In Figure 3 .1 we illustrate the assumption and show the continuum of equilibria that exists when we impose this constraint. To characterize the set of equilibria, we de ne I C H L as the premium that makes H -types indifferent between the contracts ; L and
The set of equilibria goes from the pair
by the points .Z L ; Z H /-to the pair of contracts
The pair .Z L ; Z H / is such that rms make zero pro ts when they get a fraction of low risks and 1 of high risks. By de nition of I C H L , the incentive compatibility constraint I C is satis ed as an 10 I&W require two additional assumptions to construct this equilibrium: the search cost cannot be "too large" (consumers must prefer to pay it rather than remain uninsured), and it cannot be "too low" (this critical value is related to the maximum capacity of the rms). We will adapt this second assumption to our model and then state it formally in the next section. The rst assumption is not required in our model since we assume that insurance is compulsory; individuals cannot remain uninsured.
11 It is natural to assume that 2
R S L makes no sense since the minimum premium requirement would be so low that in equilibrium everybody chooses a more expensive contract; on the other hand, R S L would imply that the minimum premium is larger than the fair premium for the highest risks in the economy (recall R S L D p H D).
equality; therefore, Z L is formally de ned as 12
At the other extreme, we must distinguish between two scenarios depending on the generosity of the minimum coverage . Assume rst that is zero or very low (this is the case depicted in Figure 3 .1). The pair of contracts represented by .A L ; A H / is determined by two features: I C is satis ed as an equality -by de nition of I C H A L -and a rm's pro ts in equilibrium are identical to what it could obtain by lling its capacity with high risks that buy the contract represented by A H I i.e.
I C H
The LHS of the above equation represents the rm's expected pro ts in a symmetric equilibrium where all rms offer .A L ; A H / ; while the RHS are the pro ts a rm could get if it lls its capacity k with H -types buying the contract A H . 13 Between these extremes, any pair of contracts such that I C holds as an equality, the high risks receive full insurance, and the low risks pay the minimum premium can be sustained as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the original game; i.e., any pair ; L and
If, on the other hand, the minimum coverage is larger than the A L de ned above, then the range of equilibrium contracts is restricted accordingly: from the zero-pro ts pair of contracts to the pair n ; ;
then pro ts -associated with the pair of contracts I C H L ; D ; ; L -are strictly negative (the rm gets zero pro ts from low risks and negative pro ts from high risks); and if L D = p H ; then pro ts are strictly positive (the insurer makes positive pro ts with both types). Therefore, since the expected pro t function
L is continuous and strictly decreasing in L ; there is a unique L such that expected pro ts are zero. 13 Note that c plays no role in the above de nition; A L is independent of the search cost. In the Appendix we provide a formal proof of the existence and uniqueness of a A L .
Figure 3.1: Continuum of Equilibrium with Minimum Premium Constraint
To formalize this result, we need to make an additional assumption that sets a lower limit to c given k:
is de ned as the expected rationing probability a consumer would face if all type H individuals go to same rm and if he also chooses to go to that particular rm. 14 Furthermore, U H . ; / is the utility level a type H individual could get if he is offered his most preferred contract in the set . ; / : . D p l /^ ; i.e., the most preferred contract with a low-type fair premium that also satis es the minimum premium constraint. Informally, (A2) requires that, no matter how attractive a contract offered by a deviating rm is (as long as it is "reasonable" in the sense that the insurer would not lose money if the contract is signed only by L-types), in a continuation equilibrium it will not be the case that all H -types want to go to the deviating rm. 15 The assumption can be rewritten as
From the above expression it is obvious that the assumption is never satised if c D 0; and on the contrary it is always satis ed when, given the maximum capacity k; the number of individuals in the economy N is large enough ( M tends to one in such a case). 16 We discuss the role of the assumption below.
We can now formally state our result.
Proposition 1. Assume that .A1/ and .A2/ hold. Then, there is a continuum of symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibria where no individual is rationed, and all firms offer a menu
The formal proof is relegated to the Appendix, where we also specify the equilibrium strategies.
What is the intuition for the proof? Take any of the proposed equilibria. A rm could deviate from the prescribed equilibria in three qualitatively different ways (recall is a minimum premium, so no deviation can lower L ).
First, it could choose a menu such that both types are worse off, but that would never be optimal because the rm would be left with no clients (recall we assumed that no rm is indispensable).
Second, it could choose a menu such that only type H consumers are better off, but then it will have only type H insurees, and L A L guarantees precisely that this is not a pro table deviation. 17 Finally, it could deviate with a menu such that both types of consumers are better off. 18 The intuition why this deviation will not pay is more subtle: by the single crossing property, any incentive compatible deviation menu will necessarily do more for type H insurees than for the L-types. Then, type H insurees will be more willing to risk being rationed, and in any continuation equilibrium the number of high risk individuals willing to go in the rst place to the deviating rm is such that L-type customers prefer to get the original contract with probability one. Therefore, as the deviating rm will attract only type H customers, the deviation will not pay.
Assumption .A2/ is key to prevent the third type of deviation discussed: if, given a maximum capacity k, the search cost c is small enough, then both types of insurees would be ready to try to get the contract offered by the deviating rm and, therefore, the deviation would be pro table. In such a case, the only equilibrium would be with zero pro ts for all rms. 19 The intuition for our proof is identical to I&W's for the three types of deviations discussed. A fourth type of deviation would be one in which the deviatingrm offer is attractive only to L-types. In the R&S's equilibrium allocation such a deviation would render negative pro ts as the R&S contract for L-types lies on the zero-pro t line. 20 In our setup, the existence of a binding minimum premium constraint limits price competition, and it generates a continuum of incentive compatible menus of contracts for which there is no feasible menu of contracts that is preferred only by L-types. 21 It is important to highlight that positive pro ts are not directly related to search costs as long as .A2/ is satis ed. Since A L does not depend on c, higher 18 Note that the minimum premium constraint being binding and the incentive compatibility for H -types being satis ed as an equality prevent rms from deviating to a menu that is striclty preferred only by L-types.
19 More formally, assumption .A2/ guarantees that for any "reasonable" deviation a rm may take (any contract that makes negative pro ts even when suscribed only by L-types would be unreasonable) not all H -types will prefer to go to the deviating rm; only a fraction will. Therefore, in equilibrium of the subgame, H -types are indifferent between the deviating rm and the equilibrium contract. Since they are also indifferent between the H -type and L-type equilibrium contracts, the single crossing property guarantees that L-types strictly prefer their equilibrium contract to the one offered by the deviating rm. 20 And it is precisely this kind of deviation -attracting only L-types-that forces the equilibrium contract for low risks to lie on its zero-pro t line. 21 A minor difference with I&W's model is that they assume search costs are not too large, so that a rationed H -type consumer would prefer to visit another rm and get his R&S allocation rather than remain uninsured. In our setup this assumption is not required since we assumed insurance is compulsory.
search costs do not give rms larger margin to increase prices and/or reduce coverage (and increase pro ts).
Among all the possible equilibria, pro ts are maximized with the pair of contracts that offer the lowest possible coverage to L-types (i.e., A L or ) and the largest possible premium for the H -types. This equilibrium is therefore payoff dominant. Additionally, if coverage for L-types is equal to the minimum coverage , it is reasonable to think that this equilibrium could be a focal point not only because of its larger payoff but also because of the salience of its label. 22 How do these pro ts compare to a monopolist's pro ts? The relevant benchmark here is a monopolist who is not capacity constrained and faces a minimum premium and minimum coverage regulation. Trivially, monopolist's pro ts would always be at least as large as the aggregate pro ts associated with any of the equilibria of Proposition 1 (the monopolist can offer the same menu of contracts). Clearly, they would be strictly larger if < A L . Also, if is relatively large and the proportion of L-types is also large, the monopolist could prefer a menu of incentive compatible contracts
; which would give larger pro ts than the pair n ; ;
Entry analysis
Proposition 1 characterized the set of equilibria assuming that the number of rms was given. Since in (almost) all the equilibria rms obtain strictly positive pro ts, it is worth analyzing the potential effect of entry on the equilibrium set. It turns out that, as the number of rms is larger, the set of equilibrium allocations shrinks, but it never reduces to the zero pro t equilibrium contracts .Z L ; Z H / : In Corollary 1 we formalize this result. 22 Alternative criteria to select among many Nash equilibria are the notions of strong equilibrium (Aumann, 1959) and risk-dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) . It is trivial to show that none of the Nash equilibria is a strong one: the unique candidate to be a strong equilibrium is the one with largest pro ts, but a coalition of F 1 rms could increase its pro ts by offering a "slightly" more generous menu of contracts that would leave aggregate pro ts (almost) unaltered and the nondeviating rm with zero pro ts.
The notion of risk dominance proposed by Harsanyi and Selten has been extended by Peski (2010) to multi-player games with many actions (potentially a continuum of actions). If we analyze the stage game at which rms offer the insurance contracts (taken as given continuation payoffs such that the rms that offer more generous contracts get H -type individuals), it is straightforward to show that none of the equilibria is cardinal generalized risk dominant. 23 The comparison between the pro ts of an unconstrained monopolist (as in Stiglitz, 1977) and the monopolist in our setup is ambiguous. On the one hand, the monopolist in our setup is constrained to choose L ; L ; , but on the other hand the participation constraint of insurees is eliminated as we assume insurance is compulsory. Corollary 1. Assume .A1/ and .A2/ hold. As the number of firms tends to infinity, there is a continuum of symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, where no individual is rationed and all firms offer a menu
is such that the contract
; D makes zero profits when subscribed only by high risk individuals; i.e.,
The formal proof is presented in the Appendix, and it is straightforward from Proposition 1. The only difference between Proposition 1 and its corollary is that A L is substituted by
: Recall that A L in Proposition 1, assuming the minimum coverage is very low, restricts the level of pro ts rms can make by reducing further and further the coverage level for L-types (and increasing the premium for H -types) because at some point, if L is so low and H so high, a rm would prefer to specialize in type H consumers. As the number of rms tends to in nity, the pro ts for each of them at any symmetric equilibrium obviously approach zero. Therefore, if all rms were offering contracts that yielded positive pro ts for both high and low risks, then a rm would choose to specialize in high-risk customers, ll its capacity, and make larger pro ts. The set of equilibria is therefore restricted to menus such that the contract for H -types makes non-positive pro ts. -new entrants cannot undercut incumbents, as any menu that is preferred by L-types would also be preferred by H -types and, as discussed in the proof of Proposition 1, would in fact attract only H -types and therefore make negative pro ts.
Two remarks about this result are in order. First, in a long run analysis the entry of new rms is just one of the factors (arguably the most relevant one) that may change, but there may be others. In particular, some factors that restrict capacity in the short-run (e.g., capital requirements) may not do it in the long run, but other factors may be relevant both in the long and short run (e.g., the network of health care providers in the case of health insurance). For our result to hold, we do not require that the long term capacity of rms remain exactly the same. All we need is that the new capacity limit (say k 0 ) is such that assumption .A2/ is satis ed. Of course, if capacity constraints become irrelevant in the long term, then our result (and I&W's existence result as well) will not hold.
For health insurers, capacity constraints can be more or less relevant in the long run, depending on the relationship between the insurer and the health care providers. Traditional or indemnity health insurance plans that simply pay physicians or hospitals on a fee-for-service scheme may face lower capacity constraints than, for example, managed care organizations (e.g., PPOs and HMOs) that take a more active role in the provision of health care. Given (1996) and Wholey et al. (1996) show that scale economies for HMOs are exhausted relatively soon. In a more recent study for the Israeli health insurance market, Schmuelli and Messika (2010) show that diseconomies of scale are relevant for the largest health insurer. According to Robinson (1999) , diseconomies of scale for managed care plans arise from increasing bureaucratization (e.g., increasing agency problems with managers or among different groups within the rm). 24 Second, we are not formally modeling an entry decision process; ours is a comparative static analysis. In a natural extension of our one-period model, we could have every period a set of potential entrants that must decide whether to enter or not before all rms offer their contracts. A subgame-perfect equilibrium for the repeated game would be that all potential entrants do enter every period, all rms offer every period the same menu Non-mandatory insurance
The model was developed assuming insurance is mandatory, which is a common feature for health insurance in many countries, but may not be relevant for other insurance markets (or some countries). We discuss here how our results change if we assume that insurance is not mandatory and therefore individuals may choose between no insurance at all and the offered contracts that we assume must satisfy the minimum premium and coverage constraints de ned by and .
In terms of our model, this assumption can be easily tted, including a participation constraint for L-types. Logically, this constraint may reduce the set of contracts that insurers can offer in equilibrium. Let I R be the coverage level such 24 Diseconomies of scale may be relevant for simpler insurance businesses as well. Cummins and Zi (1998) nd that most of the largest life insurance rms in the US face decreasing returns to scale. Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2006) show that the wave of mergers of life insurance companies in Spain that followed a deregulation of the industry allowed many rms to bene t from economies of scale, but they show also that the largest companies ended up operating under decreasing returns to scale. For non-life insurance in Malaysia, Yin (2009) nds that increasing returns to scale are followed by constant returns and then by decreasing returns, and there is no single ef cient scale as it depends on the mix of products. For the property/casualty insurance industry, Hanweck and Hogan (1996) nd evidence of scale economies for small rms, but diseconomies for those rms in the upper quartile size class. 25 If there are many potential entrants, we could end up with more rms than customers. Such an extreme result could be easily corrected if we assume, as in Smart (2000), there is a positive entry cost rms must afford and/or that rms are not risk neutral when the number of customers per rm is too low. In such a case the total number of rms would be nite and, no matter how small the entry cost (or the degree of risk aversion) is, Corollary 1 would still be valid.
that L-types are indifferent between the contract ; I R and not buying insurance at all; then all equilibria in which L < I R must be ruled out. 26 In terms of Proposition 1 we could simply impose
Z L , but there are two caveats to be considered. First, it could be the case that I R > Z L . In such a case there would be no equilibrium with both types buying insurance.
Second, since we are assuming that insurance is not mandatory, we must assume the search cost c is not "too large" to rule out the following case: if c is such that a rationed consumer prefers to remain uninsured rather than paying c, then it could be possible for a rm to deviate offering a contract that, despite being attractive for both types, only L-types are willing to visit the deviating rm and risk being rationed since they face a lower cost of remaining uninsured if rationed.
Formally, we need to assume that (10) i.e., a rationed H -type consumer prefers to visit another rm and pay c to get his equilibrium contract rather than remain uninsured.
Proposition 2. Assuming that .A1/ ; .A2/ ; and .A3/ hold, then:
there is a continuum of symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, where no individual is rationed and all firms offer a menu
2. If I R > Z L ; then in equilibrium all firms offer the single insurance contract . p H D; D/ ; which is chosen only by H -types. L-types remain uninsured.
The formal proof is omitted. The rst part is almost identical to the proof of Proposition 1. 27 As to the second part, it is immediate that I R > Z L implies there is no menu of contracts that is incentive compatible, is individually rational for Ltypes, and gives non-negative expected pro ts. Therefore, in equilibrium competing rms will offer the contract that maximizes H -types expected utility, subject to a non-negative expected pro ts constraint; i.e., a contract that is actuarially fair and gives complete coverage.
A public insurer
The role of a public insurer can easily be t in our model. In many countries private insurers coexist with a public insurer, and the latter can be considered as the relevant level of minimum coverage that private insurers must provide. This is the case, for example, of health insurance in Chile, where there exists a minimum level of coverage that all insurers must provide (de ned as a set of diagnoses and related treatments that must be covered). However, the coverage provided by the public insurer is broader than this minimum. 28 In terms of our model, we only need to reinterpret as the coverage offered by the public insurer that we assume offers a single insurance contract ; :
If we assume the public insurer has no capacity constraints, the contract ; would become the default option that consumers have, and this may also affect the equilibrium set.
Naturally, if is "too low," then nothing relevant changes, and the equilibrium set is the one characterized in Proposition 1. If is not too low, then the equilibrium contracts are those pairs
and the following condition:
This condition is analogous to assumption .A3/, but in this case the default option is ; rather than .0; 0/.
Conclusion and discussion
We presented a model that considers several characteristics of many health insurance markets: the adverse selection problem that rms face, mandatory insurance, minimum coverage, minimum premium, and, as a straightforward extension, the presence of a public insurer. We built on the model of Inderst and Wambach (2001) , which by assuming capacity constraints for insurers and search costs for insurees, solves the problem of non-existence of equilibrium in the R&S model. We added to this model a minimum premium constraint and a minimum coverage (with mandatory insurance) and have shown that for most equilibria rms obtain positive pro ts. Moreover, aggregate pro ts do not fully dissipate even if the number of rms is arbitrarily large.
The intuition why such outcomes can be sustained (even in a one-period game) is as follows: rst of all, because of the minimum premium constraint, a rm cannot attempt to attract low risks by reducing their coverage and premium. Price competition is therefore limited. Instead, in order to attract low risks, a rm must increase coverage (and possibly the premium as well), being aware that high risks will also be attracted. This strategy would pay (just as in the R&S model the separating equilibria could be destabilized by a contract that attracts both types) if it could attract a suf ciently large fraction of low risks. However, the combination of the capacity constraint and the adverse selection problem determines that only high risks would show up to the deviating rm. 29 What determines the maximum level of pro ts that can be sustained in equilibrium? If the minimum coverage required by law is very low, then pro ts in equilibrium are restricted by the pro ts a rm could earn by deviating from the equilibrium offering a contract only for high risks and lling its capacity. Logically, the larger the spare capacity that rms have in equilibrium, the larger the pro ts from deviating will be, and the smaller the aggregated pro ts that can be sustained in equilibrium. The presence of a public insurer that charges the minimum premium and/or the imposition of a relevant minimum coverage associated with the minimum premium could restrict further the set of equilibria by eliminating those with lower coverage.
In our setup where rms do have a capacity constraint, it is the imposition of the minimum constraint that makes the positive-pro ts outcomes sustainable (and very robust, they are achieved in a one-period model). Of course, the imposition of a minimum premium may have other merits that are not addressed in our model (e.g., to nance a solidarity fund), so our result cannot be interpreted as a recommendation to eliminate this kind of constraint. But these other merits should be weighed against the negative result we obtained. The case of Chile is worth noting, as in the private health insurance system that covers mainly high-income and low-risk individuals, each person or family group is supposed to nance his/her own coverage (there is no solidarity involved), but is obliged to pay a minimum premium.
The results obtained are consistent with the accusation against the ve largest private health insurers in Chile. They were accused of concertedly decreas-ing coverage (without decreasing prices), replacing within a period of a year old plans known as "100/80" (the rst gure corresponds to the coverage of hospitalization costs and the second for coverage of ambulatory care expenses) by new plans known as "90/70". The multiplicity of equilibria characterized in our model imply that, in a dynamic context, the insurers could move from one equilibrium with more generous coverage to one with lower coverage. If several rms switch to a less generous plan, sticking to the more generous plan could be a bad idea for the remaining rms, as they would suffer from the adverse selection of consumers. 30 In the trial, despite the fact that the coverage reduction was established, the antitrust tribunal (Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia) did not consider the evidence as supportive of anti-competitive practices and therefore pronounced a not guilty verdict. However, the arguments were controversial since the Tribunal argued in its sentence "...that the substitution of the 100/80 plans could take place if the company that started this replacement became convinced that its competitors in this segment would follow behind or that, otherwise, it could go back to offer 100/80 plans to the new enrollments, without suffering in the meantime very substantial losses." Such a description of the facts could certainly be considered as tacit collusion, which under Chilean antitrust legislation is punishable. 31 We expect our results can be extended to different markets where adverse selection is a relevant feature (e.g., labor and nancial markets) and constraints on the screening variables are common (e.g., constraints on the number of worked hours in the case of labor markets and on the maximum interest rate in the case of nancial markets) and to other setups where frictions arise naturally (e.g., search models).
A. Appendix
Proof of the existence and uniqueness of A L . Recall 30 There were additional facts including the reduction in marketing and sales force expenditures during the transition year that pointed to a coordinated decision by the insurers rather than a sequence of individual decisions. See Agostini et al. (2011) for a detailed analysis of the empirical evidence presented against the insurance companies.
31 See Agostini et al. (2010) for a critique to the antitrust tribunal sentence. The Supreme Court upheld the initial verdict albeit for very different reasons: the majority vote considered that hard evidence of collusion was necessary to turn a guilty verdict.
That is,
Then, all we need to show is that there is a L such that
and, by continuity, we will conclude there is a L ; say A L , such that the two sides of .13/ are equal. To show that there exists a L such that .13/ holds, we rewrite the inequality as
Since
which is satis ed for L D 0 (recall k > N =F was assumed).
To show that there is a unique value of L such that the two sides of .13/ are equal, note that the derivative of the difference between the LHS and the RHS of .13/ can be written as
where
is greater than 1 by de nition of I C H L and the strict concavity of u . / : Since we have assumed that
Proof of Proposition 1. Formally, a strategy for a single rm is a menu of two insurance contracts (one intended for each consumer type). For an insuree, a strategy must specify: rst, as a function of all F menus and his own risk, which rm will be visited and which contract chosen; second, his strategy must also specify which rm and contract to choose next if he is rationed (this choice naturally will depend on all offers made by the rms and his previous decision); third, it must specify which rm and contract to choose if he is rationed for a second time (this choice would be a function of all F offers and his previous decisions); and so on (a rational consumer could be rationed at most F 2 times). By de ning ordered sets of individuals N D f1; 2; :::; N g and rms F D f1; 2; :::; Fg, a symmetric equilibrium can be constructed as follows: 1) In equilibrium, all rms offer the same menu of contracts such that the incentive compatibility for high risks is satis ed as an equality and
We denote the contracts for L-types and H -types ; L and Analysis of possible deviations: I) Naturally, individuals have no incentives to deviate since all rms offer the same menu of contracts and in the proposed equilibrium there is no rationing. Moreover, high risk individuals are indifferent between their contract and the one designed for low types and therefore cannot gain by choosing a contract intended for L-types with positive probability. The same is true for L-types as they strictly prefer their contract. II) Suppose now that a rm deviates (we assume it is rm 1). With no loss of generality, the deviating menu must be incentive compatible. Consider the following three kinds of deviation: 1. Offering a menu such that both types are worse off would give the deviating rm a payoff of zero. We assume that for this history the rst
rm 2, the second j N F 1 k individuals visit rm 3, etc., and since .F 1/ k N the deviating rm will have no insurees. 2. Offering a menu such that only high risks are strictly better off could be pro table if the prospect of lling its capacity with high risks were better than the equilibrium payoff. However, the requirement that L A L guarantees that this is not the case.
and, since the LHS of the above equation is increasing in L (see the argument made for the proof of the uniqueness of A L ), the deviation is not pro table for any
We assume that after this history L-types among the rst bN = .F 1/c individuals visit rm 2, L-types among the second bN = .F 1/c individuals visit rm 3, etc.
H -types follow a mixed strategy: with probability they visit the deviating rm and with probability 1 they visit rm 2 if they are among the rst bN = .F 1/c individuals, rm 3 if they are among the second bN = .F 1/c individuals, etc. is such that H -types are indifferent between visiting the deviating rm (and being rationed with positive probability) and getting their equilibrium contract (assumption A2 guarantees the existence of such ). Logically, depends on the contract offered by rm 1 and the equilibrium contract offered by the rest of the rms. 3. Consider now a deviation such that both types are better-off (and the contract designed for low risks is such that p L ) and denote by 0 L ; 0 L and 0 H ; 0 H the contracts offered by the deviating rm for low and high types respectively. These contracts therefore satisfy
and the incentive compatibility constraints:
We construct the following continuation equilibrium in which only high risks choose to visit the deviating rm with positive probability: a. All low risks among the rst k visit rm 3 with probability and rm 1 with probability 1 ; etc. c. Note that if individuals behave according to 1. and 2. rationing can occur only in the deviating rm. For those rationed, we specify that they go to their corresponding rms in the next period and get their equilibrium contract. where . / is the expected rationing probability when all H -types mix with probability :
The existence of such a (potentially different for different deviations) is guaranteed by assumption A. 
by continuity there must exist a such that the equality holds. e. We need to show that a low risk individual has no incentive to visit rm 1. He
(U L 0 L ; 0 L is the utility he gets if accepted in Firm 1, U L ; L c is what he gets if rationed, and . / is the probability of being rationed). We need to show that the above expression is not greater than U L ; L ; that is
Using .25/ and taking into consideration that U H 
After some straightforward manipulations -and replacing U i . /-the above inequality can be written as rm that lls its capacity with high risks would make zero pro ts.
